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Cert to Colo. s.ct. 




1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that the Colorado Supreme Court 
erred in finding resp's confession involuntary. -
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp killed a fou~ n-year--old girl in Denver and then returned to his home in Boston. Some 





Denver and confess to the killing. The Voice informed him that 
his only alternative was to commit suicide. Resp obeyed the 
Voice and went to Denver. He went up to a police officer on the 
street and told him that he had killed someone and wanted to talk 
about it. The officer gave resp his Miranda rights, searched 
r-----------
him, and handcuffed h i m. Resp stated that he understood his 
~_______,,. 
rights, and then told the officer where and when the killing had 
taken place. The officer phoned a detective to find out if an 
unsolved murder had i ndeed occurred at that place and time; the 
detective found that such a murder had taken place. The 
detective then joined resp and the first officer, and again 
administered Miranda warnings. Resp then told the officers the 
name of the girl he had killed, led them to the scene of the 
crime, and described the murder. 
Resp was charged with second degree murder, and a 
preliminary hearing was set. Prior to the hearing, resp moved to 
- ---
suppress his confessions and all their evidentiary fruits on the ---~ 
ground that the confessions were involuntary. The trial court 
held a suppression hearing, at which a psychiatrist testified 
that resp suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that he had -
experienced "command auditory hallucinations" that he was 
powerless to resist. On the basis of this testimony, the trial ---court ruled that although the police had used no coercive tactics 
to obtain resp's statements, resp's confession was involuntary 
because it was not the product of his free will. The court 
relied primarily on Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961}, 
and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1962), in arriving at this 
• 
- --3-
conclusion. The court also ruled that resp's illness precluded a 
finding that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights. Accordingly, the court ordered suppression of all resp's 
statement/ nd all the evidentiary fruits of those statements. 
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court first ruled 
that it was improper for the trial court to rule on the 
suppression motion in advance of the preliminary hearing, as the 
exclusionary rule did not apply to such hearings, and there was 
no obstacle to the use of an inadmissible confession at the 
preliminary hearing to establish probable cause for the charges. 
Nonetheless, because the suppression issue would inevitably arise 
at trial, the court decided that judicial economy required it to 
address the issue. On the merits, the Court affirmed. Under 
this Court's decisions in Townsend v. Sain, supra, and Culombe v. 
Connecticut, supra, the court concluded, a confession may not be 
used against a defendant unless it is the "product of an 
essentially rational and free choice by its maker." Petn App, at 
18. The defendant's mental condition is relevant to the question 
of voluntariness, and person's will may be overborne by severe 
mental illness as well as by police pressure. Blackburn v. 
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). That it was not the police who 
overbore resp's will is irrelevant to the question whether 
admission of the confession would violate the Due Process Clause, 
for the element of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is 
present by virtue of the fact that the state is seeking to use 




In addition, the court held that resp's mental condition 
precluded a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. The medical 
testimony established that resp was unable to make an intelligent 
and free decision regarding exercise of his rights to remain 
silent and to confer with an attorney prior to questioning by the 
police. This constituted an independent ground for excluding all 
statements made by resp during "custodial interrogation." 
The majority reversed the trial court's suppression order 
only with respect to the fruits of petr's statements, as it was 
unclear just what--if any--evidence this ruling concerned, and 
therefore impossible to know whether the evidence was in fact 
tainted. / ~I- ~~urf!.c - L I-. 
Justice Erickson, joined by Justice Rovira, dissented. He __________, 
argued that this Court's decisions regarding voluntariness of 
confessions concerned only the question of when statements 
,-- ------ - .---,.,.. ----------
elicited or extracted from the defendant by the state should be 
--~~~
suppressed. See, e. g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 -----
(1970). The cases cited by the majority all involved situations 
in which the police had used coercion of some sort to obtain a 
confession; they were inapplicable to a defendant who, for 
whatever internal reason, volunteered a confession. The 
defendant's mental illness, standing alone, is thus no ground for 
suppressing his confession. State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800, 686 
P.2d 160 (1984). 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the Colorado Supreme 
Court's ruling on the issue of voluntariness was erroneous. 
(Note: the state expressly disavows any attack on the court's 
• 
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ruling on the issue of waiver of Miranda rights. See Petn, at 
15.) Although this Court's decisions regarding voluntariness 
have indeed stated that the issue concerns the defendant's free 
will, they make clear that a confession is inadmissible only if 
representatives of the state have "overborne" the defendant's 
will or "coerced" the confession. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S., at 
307. Culombe and Blackburn, relied on by the Court below, fall 
into this pattern: in both cases, the confessions held 
involuntary were the result of sustained badgering of a 
vulnerable defendant by the police. Although the defendant's 
mental condition was deemed relevant in both ~ases, its relevance 
was due to the fact that it rendered the defendant vulnerable to 
police pressure. In no case has the Court ever suggested that a 
confession volunteered by a defendant under no pressure 
whatsoever is inadmissible solely because the defendant's own 
mind impelled him to confess. 
In an application submitted to Justice WHITE and by him 
referred to the Conference, petr also requests a stay of 
proceedings in the trial court pending this Court's resolution of 
these issues. Petr contends that a stay is necessary, because 
absent a stay, resp will have the right to insist on an early 
preliminary hearing. If the state is forced to go through with a 
preliminary hearing without using resp's confessions and their 
fruits, the charges will be dismissed, and the issues presented 
in the cert petition will be mooted. (Petr informs the Court 
that the trial court has itself granted three stays, the latest 
• 
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of which runs until November 19; however, petr fears that these 
stays could be lifted at any time.) 
Resp has filed a brief in opposition. Resp begins by 
arguing that the decision below rests on adequate and independent 
state grounds. Colorado law itself has long forbidden the use of 
involuntary confessions. See, e.g., Tuttle v. People, 33 Colo. 
243, 79 P. 1035 (1905). The court's decision in this case simply 
fits into a long line of decisions interpreting Colorado law. 
The court's citation of this Court's precedents was for 
illustrative purposes only, as its use of signals such as "e. g." 
~ 
and "see" before some of those cites indicates. The ,.l!:>urt's 
recent opinion in People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1982), 
cited several times in the opinion below, also makes clear that 
the Colorado Constitution "requires no less" than the Federal 
Constitution in this area. 647 P.2d, at 234. 
Second, resp argues that the decision below is correct even 
if it is viewed as a decision of federal law. This Court's 
opinion in Blackburn makes it quite clear that a confession that 
is the product of insanity is involuntary. 361 U.S., at 308-309. 
No decision of this Court has ever held that police misconduct is 
required to make use of an involuntary confession violative of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Colorado court correctly 
concluded that the required element of state action was provided 
by the trial itself. 
Finally, resp argues that a decision on the question 
presented by petr will have no effect on the outcome of the 
proceedings. Petr does not challenge the lower court's ruling on 
• 
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the issue of resp's waiver of his Miranda rights, and this ruling 
itself requires suppression of all statements made by resp after 
he was placed in custody. Since the only thing he said before 
being read his rights, searched, and placed in handcuffs was that 
he had killed someone and wanted to talk, only that statement 
will be admissible if the Court reversed the Colorado Supreme 
Court solely on the question of voluntariness of the confession 
(as petr requests). That statement, standing alone, is 
insufficient to link resp to any particular crime. 
Resp has also filed a brief in opposition to the stay 
application. Resp points out that the Colorado Supreme Court's 
ruling does not bar petr from using the confession at a probable 
cause hearing. If such a hearing takes place, resp will be bound 
over for trial, which will not occur for some months. A stay is 
thus unnecessary to prevent the issues from becoming moot. 
4. DISCUSSION: (1) Stay application. A stay seems 
unnecessary for the reason given by resp. The Colorado court's 
opinion expre_s_s-ly- permits th-~ t-a<e to use resp's confession at a 
preliminary hearing (see Petn App 15-16). It is thus extremely 
unlikely that the state would suffer any prejudice by being 
forced to proceed to a preliminary hearing. In addition, the 
trial court itself has stayed the proceedings, and there is no 
reason to believe that, having waited so long, it will suddenly 
decide not to wait until this Court addresses the cert petition. 
(2) Cert petition. Resp's argument that the decision below 
rested on adequate and independent state grounds is incorrect. 
The lower court rested its ruling largely on Culombe, Townsend v. 
- --8-
Sain, and Blackburn; it cited only two Colorado cases in its 
discussion on the merits of the voluntariness issue, and one of 
those was expressly cited for its discussion of state action 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under these circumstances, it 
cannot be said that "the state court decision indicates clearly 
and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide 
separate, adequate, and independent grounds." Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). 
judgment below is not a final 
judgment, it ~ fit within the third finality exception 
set forth in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 481 
(1975): 
"In the third category are those situations where the 
federal claim has been finally decided, with further 
proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, 
but in which later review of the federal issue cannot 
be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case. 
Thus, in these cases, if the party seeking interim 
review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal 
issue will be mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, 
however, the governing state law would not permit him 
again to present his federal claims for review." 
This case fits into this category because if defendant is 
ultimately acquitted, the Double Jeopardy Clause will preclude 
the state from appealing the suppression ruling. See Sanabria v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75-78 (1978). 
On the merits, the ruling below on voluntariness strikes me 
as quite dubious if not outright bizarre. This Court has never 
held a confession invoruntary without finding that it was in some 
sense coerced by the police--that is, that state agents or 
• officers "overbore" the defendant's will. I find it hard to 
believe that the Due Process Clause or the privilege against 
• 
- --9-
self-incrimination concern themselves much with the internal 
imperatives that may make a person choose--without any prompting 
by the state--to confess to having committed a crime. A grant, 
or even summary reversal, on the voluntariness issue would appear 
called for if that were the only issue decided by the court 
below. 
Unfortunately, as resp points out, petr has failed to 
challenge the Colorado court's equally dubious finding that resp 
did not validly waive his Miranda rights. This ruling itself 
precludes admission of all resp's custodial statements, and since 
it appears that the only thing resp said before being taken into 
custody was that he "killed someone," I don't see how a reversal 
on the voluntariness issue alone would help the state. The 
statement is too vague to tie resp in to any particular crime, 
and it seems unlikely that there is any other independent 
evidence that would fill the gap. Under these circumstances, a 
grant or a reversal would send a message to a court, but it would 
not affect the outcome of an actual case. I therefore think that 
petr's bad lawyering has placed the Court in a situation where it 
cannot appropriately decide this case. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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Application for Stay Addressed 
to Justice White and By Him 
Referred to the Court 
CONNELLY 
SUMMARY: On October 2, 1985, petr filed a petn for cert to 
review a Colorado state court's pre-preliminary hearing order 
suppressing resp's murder confession. 1 In this applicat i on, petr 
asks the Court to stay all further proceedings in the case below 
pending review and disposition of the cert petn . 
BACKGROUND: Resp has been charged with second deg r ee murder 
by the Colorado authorities. According to the testimony police 
1 The application has been placed on the November 15, 1985 
conference. Petr's cert petn, which was originally scheduled for 
consideration by the Court at the November 29, 1985 Conference, 
has been moved to the November 15, 1985 Conference for 
consideration along with the application. 
s+°""' ~ ~ . 
~ 
- - 2 - -
officer who arrested resp, resp approached the officer on the 
afternoon of August 18, 1983 and confessed to an unsolved murder 
which had occurred in Denver in 1982. After eliciting the fact 
that resp had a history of mental illness, the o fficer informed 
resp of his Miranda rights. Resp stated that he understood his 
rights and proceeded to detail the murder of his 14-year-old 
female traveling companion in November-December 1981. 
Prior to his preliminary hearing, resp moved to suppress his 
confession (and all evidence derived therefrom) on the ground 
that he was mentally incompetent at the the time he confessed to 
the police. In support of the motion, resp called the 
psychiatrist appointed by the court to determine whether resp was 
competent to stand trial. The psychiatrist testified that resp 
., was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic and that his confession was 
the result of "command auditory hallucinations." Based on the 
this testimony, the trial court found that resp had not exercised 
free will in choosing to talk to the police but, rather was 
"compelled" to confess by his mental illness. The court 
concluded that the prosecution had not carried its burden of 
showing that (1) resp's statements to the police were voluntary 
under this Court's decision in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 
568 (1961), or (2) resp's waiver of his Miranda rights was 
knowing and intelligent . The trial court therefore granted the 
suppression motion • 
• 
On July 8, 1985, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in 
part, and reversed in part, the trial court's decision on resp's 
suppression motion. The state supreme court divided resp's 
• 
• 
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statements into two categories: (1) the initial statement made 
to the police officer before the issuance of the Miranda warnings 
and (2) the confession made by resp during custodial 
interrogation by the police after he was given the Miranda 
warnings. As to the first category, the Colorado Supreme Court 
found that the record supported the trial court's determination 
that resp's statement was not voluntary and concluded that the 
admission of the statement violated due process principles 
"notwithstanding that the statement was neither solicited by the 
officer nor was the result of any form of police action." As to 
the second category of statements, the Colorado Supreme Court 
determined that the psychiatrist's testimony also supported the 
trial court's conclusion that resp had not "knowingly and 
intelligently" waived his Miranda rights. Based on these 
conclusions, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's suppression of resp's statements. 2 
However, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed that part of 
the trial court's decision which suppressed "any and all evidence 
discovered by the police subsequent to August 18, 1983." The 
Colorado Supreme Court found the record below "totally devoid of 
any evidence establishing either the nature of the derivative 
evidence suppressed by the court or the nexus, if any, between 
the [resp's] inculpatory statements and the derivative evidence." 
2 Justice Erickson, joined by JusticeRovira, dissented from this 
portion of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision. The dissent 
suggested that the opinions of this Court cited by the Colorado 
Supreme Court in support of its decision only preclude the use of 
a defendant's confession when it is wrought by coercive police 
tactics. 
- - 4 - -
Although the state did not object to the proceeding below, 
the Colorado Supreme Court also disapproved of the trial court's 
scheduling of a suppression motion prior to the preliminary 
hearing. The court concluded that such a practice contravenes 
the purpose of the preliminary hearing and wastes judicial 
resources, because it delays the expeditious processing of the 
case and deprives the parties of the opportunity to fully 
litigate the suppression issues. 
The Colorado Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial 
court for a preliminary hearing stating that, on remand, the 
trial court "should conduct a preliminary hearing without regard 
to whether ••• the evidence submitted by the prosecution 
satisfies the standards of constitutional admissibility 
• applicable to a trial on the merits." In ruling on the issue of 
probable cause at the preliminary hearing, the Colorado Supreme 
Court instructed the trial court to view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution. If the trial court orders 
resp bound over for trial, the Colorado Supreme Court instructed 
the trial court not to rehear the suppression motion with regard 
to resp's statements because that portion of the trial court's 
decision was affirmed. However, the Colorado Supreme Court 
explained, the trial court would have to conduct a further 
hearing on the suppression of the prosecution's derivative 
evidence • 
On July 19, 1985, petr's motion to vacate the Colorado 
• Supreme Court's remittitur was denied and the judgment became 
' 
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final. 3 On August 6, 1985, the trial court set the matter for 
preliminary hearing . The petr immediately moved for a stay of 
the proceedings pending the filing and disposition of a petn for 
cert in this Court; the trial court granted the stay until 
September 17, 1985. 
On September 5, 1985, petr requested an extension of time in 
which to file its petn . 4 Justice White granted petr until 
October 6, 1985 to file its petn. 
On September 17, 1985, petr moved for another stay in the 
proceedings; the trial court granted a stay until October 21, 
1985. 
On October 21, 1985, petr requested a further stay; the 
trial court granted a stay until November 19, 1985. 
On October 26, the Clerk received the instant application 
for stay addressed to Justice White. On October 29, 1985, resp 
filed an opposition to the application for stay. On November 7, 
1985, Justice White referred the matter to the Court. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr requests a stay of the proceedings in the 
trial court because of the "extraordinary circumstances" 
surrounding the Colorado Supreme Court's decision. In 
particular, petr suggests that despite the Colorado Supreme 
Court's instructions, it would be unethical to proceed with a 
3 The Colorado rules of appellate procedure do not permit 
petitions for rehearing. Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court's 
remittitur issued on July 9, 1985. 
4 Resp opposed the request suggesting that petr had had more 
than ample time to file its petn. 
- - 6 - -
preliminary hearing against resp because all of the evidence in 
the case is derived from the suppressed statements. Without this 
evidence, petr alleges that the charges against resp will be 
dismissed. Since dismissal of the underlying action will moot 
the proceedings in this Court, petr suggests that the stay is 
necessary to preserve the Court's jurisdiction • 
Although the trial court has granted a stay until November 
19, 1985, petr asserts that "the stay could be lifted at any time 
or a further extension denied, and [petr] ordered to proceed with 
a preliminary hearing, without opportunity to apply to this Court 
• · for a stay." 
Resp opposes the application for stay on several grounds. 
First, resp argues that petr has failed to demonstrate a 
., reasonable likelihood that cert will be granted. He suggests 
that the Colorado Supreme Court's decision is based on "an 
independent and adequate state ground." In the alternative, resp 
contends that if the petn raises a federal question, the Colorado 
court's decision is consistent with the federal law in this area. 
• 
Second, resp attacks the alleged "extraordinary 
circumstances" of this case. He suggests that the petr's concern 
about the propriety of proceeding against resp with derivative 
evidence is feigned. Resp points out that the Colorado Supreme 
Court's opinion directs the trial court to proceed with resp's 
preliminary hearing "without regard to whether .•. the evidence 
submitted by [petr] satisfies the standards of constitutional 
admissibility .... " 
.. 
- - 7 - -
Third, resp argues that petr will suffer no immediate harm 
if the stay is denied. Since it is likely that petr will be 
bound over for trial and the trial will not be scheduled for 
another six months, resp suggests that the Court will have ample 
opportunity to review the Colorado Supreme Court's decision 
before petr's need for a stay becomes critical. 
Finally, resp contrasts his situation to that of petr. Resp 
states that he has been incarcerated since May 25, 1984, while 
petr has pursued its interlocutory appeal. Resp has never been 
arraigned on the charges against him and resp's counsel a lleges 
•· that resp is in need of medical attention for his mental 
disorder • 
DISCUSSION: Although the Court is likely to grant cert to 
• review the Colorado Court's decision in this case, petr has not 
demonstrated that the requested stay is necessary. 
• 
First, petr has not demonstrated any potential prejudice 
from proceeding with the preliminary hearing in this case. As 
resp points out, the Colorado Supreme Court has directed the 
trial court to proceed with the preliminary hearing against resp 
without regard to the constitutional admissibility of the 
evidence at trial. In light of the Colorado Supreme Court's 
instructions, it is unlikely that petr will be violating any 
ethical guidelines by proceeding against resp. Furthermore, 
based on the Colorado Supreme Court's summary of the evidence, 
there is little doubt that resp will be bound over for trial. A 
stay is therefore not necessary to preserve the Court's 
jurisdiction. 
- - 8 - -
Second, the requested stay is premature. Supreme Court Rule 
44.4 provides that an application for stay will not be 
entertained, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, 
unless application for relief has previously been presented to, 
and denied by, the appropriate courts below. In this case, the 
~ trial court's stay is still in effect and there is no indication 





to renew its stay in the future . 
Finally, petr does not appear to be diligently pursuing its 
appeal. Petr took almost four months to file its cert petn in 
this Court. By contrast, resp has been incarcerated since May 
1984 without a preliminary hearing. If the stay is denied, resp 
will, at least, be arraigned and a trial date will be set. 
CONCLUSIONS: Even if the Court decides to grant cert in 
this case, the application for stay should be denied because (1) 
petr will not be prejudiced if the preliminary hearing goes 
forward, (2) a stay is not necessary at this point to preserve 
the Court's jurisdiction, and (3) the requested stay is premature 
because the trial court's stay is still in effect. By contrast, 
petr will be prejudiced by the requested delay. He has already 
been incarcerated for over seventeen months without arraignment. 
There is a response. 
11/9/85 Niddrie 
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I suggest that the Court enter the 
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The motion of respondent for leave 
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granted. The petition for writ of 
certiorari is granted. In addition to 
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condition render .his waiver of 
Miranda rights ineffective? 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
COLORADO v. FRANCIS BARRY CONNELLY 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF COLORADO 
No. 85-660. Decided December-, 1985 
MEMORANDUM OF JUSTICE BRENNAN. I 
This grant of certiorari is yet another instance supporting 
the concern that the Court shows an unseemly eagerness to 
act as "the adjunct of the State and its prosecutors in facili-
tating efficient and expedient conviction .... " Wainwright 
v. Witt, -- U. S. --, -- (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissent-
ing). Most of ten, this concern has been evoked by the 
Court's overly narrow interpretations of the Constitution's 
fundamental guarantees and the laws established to secure 
relief from violations of those guarantees. See id.; United 
States V. Leon, -- u. s. --, -- (1984) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting). However, the Court's willingness to take spe-
cial judicial action to assist the prosecutor has not been lim-
ited to its interpretations of substantive law. For example, 
in New Jersey v. T. L. 0. , -- U. S. -- (1984), reargu-
ment was directed on a constitutional question not raised by 
either party because it provided a broader basis for uphold-
ing the State's action. Similarly, two Terms ago, JUSTICE 
STEVENS noted the "quite striking" fact that during the pre-
ceding two-and-a-half years the Court had summarily re-
versed, without briefing or oral argument, 19 criminal 
cases-every one on the petition of the warden or the pros-
ecutor and every one in his favor. Florida v. Myers, --
U. S. --, -- - --, and n. 3 (1984) (STEVENS J., dis-
senting). Nothing has changed in the year-and-a-half since 
that decision, for, although in the immediate wake of JUSTICE 
STEVENS' dissent the Court did summarily reverse a few con-
victions on the petition of a criminal defendant, the trend to 











has resumed and the record now stands at 26-4. 1 No par-
ticularly informed understanding of statistics is required to 
appreciate that the likelihood of courts so consistently erring 
in favor of defendants is truly remote and that only a one-
sided exercise of discretion can explain these results. 
The Court's treatment of this case provides another clear 
example of why there is concern that the Court engages in 
injudicious efforts to assist prosecutors. Today, the Court 
takes the unprecedented step of rewriting a prosecutor's cer-
tiorari petition for him, enabling him to seek reversal on a 
ground he did not present himself. 2 
Respondent approached a uniformed police officer and 
stated that "he had killed someone" and wanted to tell the of-
ficer about it. Before questioning respondent about the kill-
ing, the officer informed respondent of his Miranda rights. 
1 The four cases since Florida v. Myers decided in favor of a criminal 
defendant are: Payne v. Virginia, -- U. S. -- (1984) (per curiam); 
Thompson v. Louisiana, -- U.S. -- (1984) (per curiam); Smith v. Il-
linois, -- U. S. -- (1984) (per curiam); and Lanier v. South Carolina, 
-- U. S. -- (1985) (per curiam). The seven cases decided in favor of 
the warden or prosecutor during that same period are: Massachusetts v. 
Upton, -- U.S. -- (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Rodriguez, --
U. S. -- (1984) (per curiam); United States v. Woodward, -- U. S. 
- (1984) (per curiam); United States v. Gagnon, - U. S. -- (1985) 
(per curiam); United States v. Benchimol, -- U. S. -- (1985) (per 
curiam); Delaware v. Fensterer, -- U. S. -- (1985) (per curiam); and 
Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, -- U. S. -- (1985) (per curiam). 
Payne, Thompson, and Smith followed closely after JUSTICE STEVENS' 
dissent in Florida v. Myers. Since Smith was decided on December 10, 
1984, however, five of the last six summary dispositions have been in favor 
of the State. 
I am not suggesting that all the summary judgments awarded to the 
State were incorrect or improper, although I did not agree with the result 
in many of the cases. It is the Court's selective employment of its sum-
mary disposition power only in favor of the State that is most disturbing. 
2 This action is even less justifiable than the improper decision to order 
reargument in New Jersey v. T. L. 0 ., supra, since here the Court cannot 
even point to having heard oral argument as justification for revising the 





Respondent waived his rights and proceeded to confess to the 
murder of a young girl. After being charged with murder, 
respondent moved to suppress his statements as made invol-
untarily. A psychiatrist testified that respondent believed 
that the voice of God had commanded him to confess or com-
mit suicide. The psychiatrist testified that respondent was 
suffering from "chronic paranoid schizophrenia" and "com-
mand auditory hallucinations" when he confessed and that re-
spondent's actions were not the product of a free will. The 
trial court suppressed statements made both before and after 
the Miranda warnings were given on the ground that re-
spondent's mental state rendered these confessions involun-
tary and tainted his waiver of the Miranda rights. The Col-
orado Supreme Court affirmed, and this petition followed. 
The prosecutor carefully limited his petition to this Court to 
challenge only the suppression of respondent's initial, unsolic-
ited statements. The petition expressly states that "[re-
spondent's] later confession, which involves a Miranda issue, 
is not an issue in this petition." Pet. for Cert. 15. Despite 
this, the Court directs the parties to brief and argue that 
issue. 
We do not know why the prosecutor chose not to seek re-
view of the Miranda issue. But, whatever the reason, re-
view was not sought, and it is hardly for this Court to "sec-
ond chair" the prosecutor to alter his strategy or guard him 
from mistakes. Under our"ltule 21.l(a), "[o]nly the ques-
tions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be 
considered by the Court." Given petitioner's express dis-
claimer that the Miranda issue is presented, that question 
obviously is not "fairly included" in the question submitted. 
The Court's direction that the parties address it anyway 
makes meaningless in this case the provisions of this rule and 
is plainly cause for concern, particularly since it is clear that a 
similar dispensation would not be granted a criminal defend-
ant, however strong his claim. In asking the parties to ad-




for certiorari, the Court goes beyond a mere philosophic incli-
nation to facilitate criminal prosecution: the Court gives the 
appearance of being not merely the champion, but actually an 
arm of the prosecution. 3 
I realize that, in itself, this order is not a matter of great 
significance. But even matters of small effect can cloak is-
sues of great moment. In making the specific guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights a part of our fundamental law, the Framers 
recognized that limitless state power afflicts the innocent as 
well as the guilty, that even a crime-free world is not worth 
the fear and oppression that inevitably follow unrestricted 
police power, and that a truly free society is one in which 
every citizen-guilty or innocent-is treated fairly and ac-
corded dignity and respect by the State. Of course, the 
Framers could not foresee the shape our society would take 
as the nation developed. Nor could they foresee how the po-
lice function would evolve to keep pace. Rather, it has fallen 
to this Court-the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution," 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 211 (1962)-to enforce the 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights and preserve the princi-
ples established in 1789. Ours is the duty to prevent en-
croachment on these principles by over-zealous police in the 
discharge of their great responsibility to prevent crime. 
Every law-abiding citizen shares with the Court the belief 
that the prevention of crime is an essential governmental 
function. However, the members of this Court have the 
special responsibility to recognize that, as essential as is the 
goal of preventing crime, "the Court must be ever mindful of 
its primary role as the protector of the citizen and not the 
warden or the prosecutor." Florida v. Myers, -- U. S., 
at -- (STEVENS, J., dissenting). This Court has, sadly, 
lost sight of this role, to the detriment of the rights of each of 
us. I can only repeat: "One can only hope that this day too 
3 I express no views about the merits of the issues on which certiorari is 
now granted. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U. S. 246 (1959) (state-
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will soon pass." Wainwright v. Witt, -- U.S., at --
(BRENNAN' J.' dissenting). 
• 
' ~- -~ .. -CCC 01/08/86 '(~ ~ ~ 0. ~ 
~ tt.o ~(M),t. . 
TO: JUSTICE POWELL 
No. 85-660, Colorado v. Connelly 
In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
"compulsion" from a defendant's auditory hallucinations urging 
him to confess rendered his confessions involuntary. On January 
10, the prosecutor's petition for certiorar i will go to its fifth 
conference. 
---------- ---Justice White has drafted an order granting certio-rari and expanding the question ? esented to include the "Miranda 
. . h . d f C JJ b~ 0V . . d b th ......---CJ v"TM ;..--:RAB wa1 ver" issue. T 1s ra t 11as een JO1ne y e , , , 
VWHR, an~ oc. Justice Brennan has circulated a very strong memo-
randum criticizing "the unprecendented step of rewriting a prose-
cutor's certiorari petion for him, enabling him to seek reversal 
on a ground he did not present himself." P. 2. 
Yesterday, pursuant to my duties in the "pool," I spent 
the better part of the afternoon researching the question of an 
expansive reading of the "question presented." I now believe 
that I am more at home in the area, and have found that the Court 
has typically hewed to a surprisingly strict requirement in this 
area. The Court addresses only the question explicitly present-,.....-__....--
ed, or an inescapable collateral issue where failure to do so 
would render the rest of the Court's opinion a frolic and detour 
(not the case here) . The only express expansion of a petition 
for certiorari that I could find was Brandon v. Holt, u.s. 
___ , 105 s.ct. 873 (1983). In that case, the Court allowed a 
petition to be amended to sue an official to be sued "in his of-
• 
t -.. - - page 2. 
ficial capacity" - in conformity with the district court's find-
ing of facts and the court of appeals' conclusion. 
To be honest, my research yesterday has shaken my faith 
in my recommendation. Justice Brennan's memorandum seems much 
-----strengthened by my inability to find support for a broadening of ----- ---------------~ the "question presented." I conclude that to broaden the "ques--------------...___....---------~ 
tion presented" would be a significant departure from this 
Court's past conduct. over time, this Court's expansive reading I 
of pleadings may be more detrimental to the ends of justice than 
allowing the Colorado Supreme Court's bizarre holding to stand. 
I do not recommend granting the petition for an augment-
ed "question presented." A simple grant and summary reversal 
colorably has the advantage of not explicitly rewriting the peti-
tion for certiorari, but still undoing a piece of bad law. As I 
understand summary reversals, however, the action would still 
entail passing on the merits of the "question presented" rather 
than simply expressing the Court's disapproval of the holding 
below for whatever reason. 
My extended for ray into this area of · the law and its 
unexpected results lead me to recommend that you vote to deny. 
January 8, 1986; 11:14 AM Cabell Prelim. Mem. Supp. 
• 
- - January 10, 1986 Court v· oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued . . ................ . , 19 .. . Assigned ................. . , 19 .. . 
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No . 85-660, Colorado v. Connelly (Supreme Court, Colorado) 
Memorandum to File 
The questions presented are well stated by respondent's 
brief: 
1. Whether the Due Process Clause precludes 
use at trial of an inculpatory statement 
made to police by Respondent which was com-
pelled by his psychotic mental condition but 
which was not the result of coercive police 
conduct? 
2. Whether Respondent's mental condition rendered 
his waiver of Miranda rights ineffective? 
The facts are not in dispute . Respondent stopped Officer 
Anderson on a Denver Street, and stated that "He had killed 
someone and wanted to talk about it" to Anderson. Anderson 
advised Respondent of his Miranda rights, and Respondent 
stated that he understood. Respondent then told the officer 
that he had "killed a girl he had been traveling with near the 
area of West Mississippi Avenue". The officer testified that 
at first he thought Respondent was a "crackpot" who some-
times talked about criminal activities, usually under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol. But the officer stated that 
respondent was neatly dressed, and that his "demeanor did not 
coincide with my feelings that he might be mentally unstable ... 
or under the influence of alcohol or drugs." Respondent pro-
duced his driver's license to verify his name and address. 
• 
- -
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The officer called the National Crime Information Center, and 
ascertained that no warrants were outstanding against Respondent. 
A detective was called, and again Miranda warnings were 
given. Respondent again stated that "he wanted to talk to 
Anderson because his conscience had been bothering him." 
Respondent, following his arrest and additional Miranda warnings, 
led the officers to the place where an unidentified body had been 
found some months earlier. Respondent was charged with second 
degree murder . Initially he was declared incompetent to stand 
trial, but after six months of treatment he was found to be 
competent. Respondent moved to suppress his inculpatory state-
ments on the ground that he was mentally incompetent at the time 
he confessed . In addition, and for this same reason, he argued 
that his waiver of Miranda rights (the right to counsel , etc.) 
was involuntary. 
On a motion to suppress, a court appointed psychiatrist 
testified that Respondent's suffered from chronic schizophrenia 
and had experienced "connnand hallucinations". The connnand, 
according to Respondent, was God's voice telling him to confess 
his crime to a policeman . The psychiatrist further testified 
that a "connnand hallucination .. . affects [one's] volitional 
abilities; that is his ability to make free and rational choices." 
• 
- -
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But the psychiatrist stated that this type of illness "did not 
significantly impair [Respondent's] cognitive abilities, for 
example he probably had the capacity" to understand Miranda 
rights. 
The Trial Court granted Respondent's motion to suppress, 
and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. It concluded that 
unless a statement is the "product of an essentially rational 
and free choice by its maker, it may [not] be used against him 
at trial. The admission of such a statement would offend due 
process of law." The court went on to say "the absence of police 
coercion or duress does not foreclose a finding of involuntariness." 
The Colorado Supreme Court also upheld the suppression of 
Respondent's subsequent inculpatory statements on the ground that 
he did not validly waive his Miranda rights. Again, the Court 
relied on medical testimony that "clearly established that 
Respondent's mental condition was such that he was incapable of 
making an intelligent and free decision." 
Two Justices dissented on these questions. In a brief 
opinion by Judge Erickson (in my view the ablest judge on that 
court), he wrote that "a statement can be suppressed as involun-
tary only if it has been extracted by police questioning or 
obtained through improper external force .... Statements which 
a defendant volunteers independent of police questioning or 
external force should not be subject to suppression under the 
• 
- -
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Fifth Amendment". Although the statement should not have 
been suppressed, the two dissenters agreed that "Respondent's 
mental condition may be introduced at trial to attack the 
creditability of his confession, or to establish nonresponsibility 
for the crime committed .... " 
The SG has filed an amicus brief that, at least tentatively, 
I am inclined to think requires reversal of the Colorado court. 
I t is agreed that there was no improper conduct by the police. 
Respondent sought out a police officer, and insisted on con-
fessing to relieve his conscience, even after Miranda warnings 
were given and understood. Moreover, when in custody - and 
again after Miranda warnings had been given - Respondent waived 
his right to counsel and reiterated his confession. The effect 
of the Colorado court's ruling would be to bar the admission 
into evidence of a defendant's inculpatory statement whenever 
it was found - by a psychiatrist or otherwise - that it was not 
the product of the defendant's "free will". 
Miranda provides no support, according to the SG, for the 
suppression of voluntary statements that are not the product of 
custodial interrogation or other police misconduct. Moreover, 
Miranda warnings were given several times, and no one questions 
that Respondent understood these but still felt under a compulsion 
• 
- -
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(from God according to the psychiatrist's testimony) to 
repeat his confession. A basic point made by the SG is that 
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, like the 
Due Process Clause, protects a citizen against Government 
coercion" - not some psychologic or other personal reason for 
confessing to crime. 
The SG also makes a persuasive argument that the Colorado 
court "free will standard" would be difficult to apply. In 
addition to suppressing confessions that resulted from mental 
disability, the principle also would apply to a confession made 
under the influence of drugs, or alcohol, or because a criminal 
developed "overwhelming remorse" that caused him to clear his 
conscience. 
It must be remembered that, although closely related, Respon-
dent relies on the Due Process Clause in arguing that the 
confession was "compelled" by Respondent's psychotic mental 
condition, and this was compulsion that under principles of 
fairness properly precluded use of the confession. In addition, 
Respondent's counsel insists that his mental condition "rendered 
his waiver of Miranda rights ineffective". The brief on behalf 
of Respondent is well written, and uses Miranda - and some of 
its quotes - to good advantage. Perhaps Respondent's strongest 
• 
- -
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point is that many of our decisions have emphasized that the 
waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently made, and the Respondent's condition precluded 
such a waiver. An answer to this argument is that the 
psychiatrist testified that Respondent understood the 
Miranda warnings, but felt under a compulsion to confess 
his crime . The difference may be subtle, but it is impor-
tant. 
I nevertheless remain tentatively inclined to reverse. 
I would emphasize that at trial Respondent's mental condition, 
and the compulsion to kill that may have resulted therefrom, 
would be proper evidence that might well persuade a jury to 
acquit him. The entire story, including the voluntary con-
fessions and the psychotic state of mind of Respondent, could 
be presented to the court or jury. 
Unless my Clerk differs, a short bench memo will suffice. 
L.F . P . 
• 
• 
- .. - +Jf 
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Questions Presented 
(1) Whether the Due Process Clause requires the 
suppression of respondent's confession, which was compelled by 
j 
his psychotic mental condition, in the absence of coercive police 
conduct. (2) Whether respondent's mental condition rendered the 
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I. Background 
The respondent approached a uniformed policeman and 
confessed that he had committed a murder. The officer read resp 
his Miranda rights, which resp said he understood. Resp asserted 
that he wanted to talk about the crime, and described the victim 
and the circumstances of the murder. After handcuffing resp, the 
policeman called in a detective, who also informed resp of his 
rights. Eventually resp led the off ice rs to the scene of the 
crime and provided a more detailed confession. Resp indicated 
✓ 
that he was compelled to confess by God, who warned resp that he 
either must confess to the murder or commit suicide. 
Initially resp was declared incompetent to stand trial, 
and was committed to a psychiatric hospital. Six months later, 
resp had recovered sufficiently to be tried. He then asked the 
trial court to suppress both his initial, unsolicited confession 
and his second confession and statements made after he was read 
his rights. The judge conceded that resp had been properly 
advised of his rights, and that the police had not used "threats, 
force, coercion or tricks" to obtain the inculpatory information. 
✓ Nevertheless, the ~ ourt granted the motion to suppress because it 
found that resp's confessions were not the product of "free 
will." Based on the testimony of a court-appointed psychiatrist, 
the judge concluded that resp's "auditory hallucinations" -- the 
voice of God -- overwhelmed his volition; therefore the initial 
statement must be suppressed because it was involuntary. 
Similarly, the later statements and the second confession must be 
suppressed, said the court, because resp's psychotic compulsion 
• 
- - 3. 
left him unable to exercise his right to remain silent. Resp's 
waiver of his Miranda rights thus was not "knowing and 
intelligent." 
The Colorado s.ct. affirmed. The court began with the 
proposition that "the absence of police coercion or duress does 
not foreclose a finding of involuntariness." Citing Blackburn v. 
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). It then agreed that the 
psychiatrist's unrebutted testimony proved that neither the 
initial confession nor the waiver of Miranda was voluntary. The 
court remanded the case so that the trial court could consider 
whether the involuntary confessions tainted the subsequently 
acquired ev i dence. 
✓ 
Justice Erickson dissented. He stated that confessions 
should not be suppressed absent improper police questioning or 
coercion. The effect of resp's mental compulsion, said the 
dissent, should influence the probative value of the confession, 
not its admissibility. 
II. Discussion 
A. Absence of Police Coercion 
The main issue in this case undoubtedly will be whether 
confessions may be suppressed absent some coercive action by the 
police. I agree with the tentative views expressed in your memo 
that ~ xternal coercio~ should be a prerequisite to suppression. 
The best reason for reversing the decision below is that 
),~t the principles 
:"J , c_P~· 
11i-~ ard to apply 
~~· 
expressed in that opinion would be extraordinarily 
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resp's peculiar psychological make-up left him no choice whether 
to confess or not. But the decision to confess before arrest 
rarely is "rational" (normally a lawyer would discourage his 
client from doing so), and thus the argument could be made that 
all defendants who confess do so because they are "compelled" by - ------~- - --- ------- ~- -------
some internal force. ---- This force may be grounded in fear, guilt, ------. --
religious upbringing, or an infinite variety of other sources 
that courts are poorly equipped to evaluate. All of these 
feelings are "coercive" in a sense, but it would be difficult for 
courts to obtain reliable information on these feelings, or 
establish consistent decisionmaking standards on when they 
override free will. By requiring some level of official 
misconduct, the Court would keep the focus of suppression 
hearings primarily on external factors, making the test easier to 
administer. 
The response to this argument is that the Colorado 
decision can be limited to the facts. It is uncontroverted that 
resp was mentally incompetent when he confessed, and that his 
confession was caused by his illness. There is no reason (the 
argument goes) to treat this issue differently than we treat 
insanity pleas: in general, courts may presume that uncoerced ..,._ 
confessions are voluntary; a suspect can overcome this 
presumption only by showing that his mental illness made his 
actions involuntary. By restricting the rule to those with 
psychiatric illnesses, the courts never would have occasion to 
confront the more difficult cases hypothesized by the petr (e.g. 
t 
• 
- -· wi.J ~fa;;) ·? 
suppressing an uncoerced confession made while the suspect was 
drunk). ,..-
""""-::?. 
There is merit to this argument -- courts have enough 
experience with mental-illness related questions to make a more 
limited rule feasible. I do not think that such a rule would be - - -
wise, however. There is no principled reason to distinguish 
between confessions compelled by mental illness and those 
compelled by other internal sources; it is not clear, for 
example, that "command hallucinations" are more likely to 
overcome free will than ' tdeeply held religious beliefs. It also ~ 
is a heroic assumption that there ever is just one reason for the 
confession. The compulsion to confess undoubtedly involves a / 
variety of feelings, doubts, and fears, making the source of the 
compulsion impervious to neat categorization. In short, the line 
resp asks us to draw is a bright one, but it may not be a logical 
one. 
The threshold requirement of police misbehavior is 
~ upported by the case law. This Court consistently has held that -"absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning 
admissions." United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 
(1977), quoted in Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (1985); 
see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) {describing 
5th amendment as the Framers' reaction to government 
inquisition). As resp points out, the Court also has looked 
closely at the suspect's mental condition in determining whether 
a confession was voluntary. See Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 
• 
- - 6. 
U.S. 218, 226 (1973). In virtually every case involving a 
✓ 
suppression, however, there was evidence of police coercion. See 
Brief Amicus Curiae by the Colo. Att. Gen. at 8 n. 7. 
Admittedly, the Court probably has not considered a case where 
defendant has conceded that there was no coercion, so it cannot 
be said that precedent alone compels a particular result. But 
given that uncoerced confessions are "inherently desirable," 
Washington, supra, 187, and that the Court is V-:eluctant to 
exclude potentially reliable admissions, Jackson v. Denno, 378 ;f--
U.S. 368, 381 (1964), it is fair to conclude that the decision 
below is inconsistent with the spirit of this Court's precedent. 
The s.ct. case relied on by the Colo. s.ct. is not to the 
contrary. The state court concluded 
inquiry is whether resp' s confession 




determined that free choice could be overborne as surely by 
mental illness as by external pressure. See Blackburn v. 
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). But Blackburn does not hold that a 
mental deficiency QY_ itself renders a confession involuntary. In 
that case a mentally disturbed defendant was interrogated for 8-9 
hours in a small room without his attorney present. Even though 
the Court stated that it was contrary to our "basic sense of 
justice" to admit a confession from an insane defendant, it 
apparently was influenced by the coercive circumstances 
surrounding the confession. See id., at 207-208. 
The second reason for requiring external coercion is that 
a contrary rule would hinder law enforcement efforts. The 
obvious problem is the loss of confessions. The less obvious 
~ 
• 
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problem is that police will have no way of knowing when they can 
use confessions as a springboard for further investigation. When 
the police coerce a suspect, they are on notice that both the 
confession and the fruits of that confession will be suppressed. 
But the police cannot tell from looking at a suspect why he 
decided to confess, so they cannot know whether the statement 
will be admissible, or whether it will taint subsequently 
gathered ev i dence. 
This case is a perfect illustration. The policeman who '4, 
heard resp' s confession testified that he thought resp ~ med ~ 
rational at the time. 
~
If the decision below were the law, the 
policeman would face a dilemma: he could proceed with the 
investigation and risk having all the evidence derived from the 
confession suppressed, or he could wait for a judicial 
determination of whether the confession was voluntary. Neither 
alternative is practical or sensible. While the effect on law 
enforcement is a relatively small concern (we routinely ask the 
police to make similarly hard choices), it points toward 
reversing the state court. 
The final argument supporting a "state coercion" 
requirement is that there is little harm to defendants such as ~ 
resp in admitting their confessions. There already are 
procedures in place to protect the mentally i 11 from e r iminal 
convictions. If a suspect is psychotic, he will be considered 
- · ..I.. ---· ~ ----· - -incompetent to stand trial. 
rely on the insanity defense. 
If he is competent, he is free to 
For those who are competent but 
not insane, there are further protections: as the dissent below 
• 
- -- 8. 
pointed out, a defendant is free to introduce evidence of his 
mental problems to the jury, 
therefore was unreliable; the 
and argue 
focus then 
that his confession 
. h ✓ b ' 1s on t e pro at1ve 
value of the evidence, rather than the admissibility. Also, if 
the confession obviously is unreliable (e.g., "I shot the victim 
just before I shot Lincoln"), the trial judge has the discretion 
to suppress the statements as more prejudicial than probative. 
Fed. R. Ev. 403. 
B. Waiver of Miranda rights 
Resp was advised of his Miranda rights immediately after 
he made his unsolicited confession. He nonetheless insisted on ----. 
discussing the er ime, re-admitting his guilt, and showing the 
\_ 
police where he had left the body. The trial court ruled that 
all of this information was inadmissible, because resp's mental 
condition left him incapable of making a "knowing and 
intelligent" waiver of his right to remain silent and to consult 
counsel. The briefs devote little time to this issue, but in 
many ways it is more difficult than the first question presented. 
The petr argues that Miranda warnings are designed to 
guard against official overreaching during interrogation. 
Because the police did not coerce defendant in this case, petr 
reasons, then the rights were waived voluntarily. This argument 
is only half right. Whether a defendant validly waives his 
Miran~ ✓two-part inquiry: first, the waiver must 
have been voluntary (i.e., uncoerced); second, "the waiver must 
have been made with the full awareness both of the nature of the 
• 
- - 9. 
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it." Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986); see 
also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 (1979). If the 
analysis in Part A, supra, is persuasive, the absence of police 
misconduct makes resp's waiver voluntary. It also is necessary, 
however, to ask whether resp appreciated the nature and 
consequences of his waiver, despite his mental illness. 
The <v"idence of resp's ability to understand his rights 
comes from the psychiatrist's testimony at the suppression 
hearing. The psychiatrist stated that resp's illness: 
~ -
really affects his volitional abilities; that is, his 
ability to make free and rational choices. I think 
that his illness did not significantly impair his 
cognitive abilities, .•• it would be my belief, for 
example, that when he was read his Miranda rights, he 
probably had the capacity to know that he was being 
read his Miranda rights, and [that] he had certain 
rights . . • • [But] I think he wasn't able to use that 
information because of [his illness]. 
J.A. 25-26 (emphasis added). These findings discredit the claim 
----. 
that resp' s waiver was uninformed or unintelligent; the 
psychiatrist simply concluded that defendant relt compelled to 
speak, regardless of his rights. The testimony shows, however, 
that resp was aware that he had rights, and presumably, that he 
understood their significance. The psychiatrist's testimony 
admittedly is vague in parts. It is not clear what he meant when 
he said that resp was not able to "use" his rights. The 
testimony as a whole, however, shows that resp' s illness @ y 
~
affected his will to stay silent, not his ability to unders"Eand 
r---.._ __ _ 
and reason. Consequently, I think the sta~--c- o_u_r-"hrrea when it 
• 
• 
- - 10. 
suppressed petr's statements made after the Miranda warnings were 
read. 
✓ 
For what it is worth, the American Psychological Assoc. (as 
amicus) agrees that those suffering from defendant's type of 
---------- - -- ----·---· -~ 
mental illness normally are not cognitively impaired. Resp's 
V"""""" 
command hallucinations may have rendered his actions involuntary, 
but there is no necessary correlation between these delusions and 
cognitive impairment, or delusions and the ability to reason 
logically. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the APA, at 17-19. These 
conclusions, of course, are based on general psychiatric 
literature, not on an examination of resp. 
There is one other issue that warrants brief mention. The 
V SG suggests in the alternative that the second confession should 
have been admitted because _it was not the product of a police 
"interrogation." The SG argues that in this case resp 
volunteered all of the information, and that the police simply 
_;, 
stated "what happened next?" or "tell us what happened." This 
type of questioning does not raise the dangers that Miranda was 
designed to address, says the SG, so there is no requirement that 
the rights be waived to make the statements admissible. 
The SG' s theory does not provide a sound basis for the 
decision. The SG is inviting this Court to make extremely fine ~ 
distinctions between asking for answers and encouraging them, 
between interrogation on the one hand and merely allowing a 
suspect to confess on the other. The Court appears to have 
interpreted "interrogation" quite broadly. See Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 412 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) 
• 
- - 11. 
("Christian burial" speech to mentally ill defendant a "skillful 
and effective form of interrogation."). Here resp was in custody 
and was prompted to tell his story. Given that there is a better 
basis for reaching the same result, the Court should decline the 
SG's invitation to engage in such precarious line drawing. 
I recommend that you vote to reverse the decision of the 
Colorado Supreme Court, and remand the case for further 
proceedings • 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-660 
COLORADO, PETITIONER v. FRANCIS 
BARRY CONNELLY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
COLORADO 
[November -, 1986) 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the 
United States Constitution requires a court to suppress a 
confession when the mental state of the defendant, at the 
time he made the confession, interfered with his "rational in-
tellect" and his "free will." Because this decision seemed to 
conflict with prior holdings of this Court regarding the admis-
sibility of confessions and the validity of waivers, we granted 
certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1986). We now reverse. 
I 
On August 18, 1983, Officer Patrick Anderson of the Den-
ver Police Department was directing traffic in downtown 
Denver. Responde.nt Francis Connelly approached Officer 
Anderson and, without any prompting, stated that he had 
murdered someone and wanted to talk about it. Anderson 
immediately advised respondent that he had the right to re-
main silent, that anything he said could be used against him 
in court, and that he had the right to an attorney prior to any 
police questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 
(1966). Respondent stated that he understood these rights 
but he still wanted to talk about the murder. Understand-
ably bewildered by this confession, Officer Anderson asked 
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been drinking, denied that he had been taking any drugs, and 
stated that, in the past, he had been a patient in several men-
tal hospitals. Officer Anderson again told Connelly that he 
was under no obligation to say anything. Connelly replied 
that it was "all right," and that he would talk to Officer 
Anderson because his conscience had been bothering him. 
To Officer Anderson, respondent appeared to understand 
fully the nature of his acts. Tr. 18. 
Shortly thereafter, Homicide Detective Stephen Antuna 
arrived. Respondent was again advised of his rights, and 
Detective Antuna asked him "what he had on his mind." Tr. 
24. Respondent answered that he had come all the way from 
Boston to confess to the murder of Mary Ann J enta, a young 
girl whom he had killed in Denver sometime during N ovem-
ber, 1982. Respondent was taken to police headquarters, 
and a search of police records revealed that the body of an 
unidentified female had been found in April, 1983. Respond-
ent openly detailed his story to Detective Antuna and Ser-
geant Thomas Haney, and readily agreed to take the officers 
to the scene of the killing. Under Connelly's sole direction, 
the two officers and respondent proc;eeded in a police vehicle 
to the location of the crime. Respondent pointed out the ex-
act location of the murder. Throughout this episode, Detec-
tive Antuna perceived no indicati_on whatsoever that re-
spondent was suffering from any kind of mental illness. Tr. 
33-34. 
Respondent was held overnight. During an interview 
with the public defender's office the following morning, he 
became visibly disoriented. He began giving confused an-
swers to questions, and for the first time, stated that "voices" 
had told him to come to Denver and that he had followed the 
directions of these voices in confessing. Tr. 42. Respond-
ent was sent to a state hospital for evaluation. He was ini-
tially found incompetent to assist in his own defense. By 
March of 1984, however, the doctors evaluating respondent 






At a preliminary hearing, respondent moved to suppress 
all of his statements. Doctor Jeffrey Metzner, a psychiatrist 
employed by the state hospital, testified that respondent was 
suffering from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic 
state at least as of August 17, 1983, the day before he con-
fessed. Metzner's interviews with respondent revealed that 
respondent was following the "voice. of God." This voice in-
structed respondent to withdraw money from the bank, to 
buy an airplane ticket, and to fly from Boston to Denver. 
When respondent arrived from Boston, God's voice became 
stronger and told respondent either to confess to the killing 
or to commit suicide. Reluctantly following the command of 
the voices, respondent approached Officer Anderson and 
confessed. 
Dr. Metzner testified that, in his expert opinion, respond-
ent was experiencing "command hallucinations." Tr. 56. 
This condition interfered with respondent's "volitional abili-
ties; that is, his ability to make free and rational. choices." 
Tr. 56. Dr. Metzner further testified that Connelly's illness 
did not significantly impair his cognitive abilities. Thus, re-
spondent understood the rights he had when Officer Ander-
son and Detective Antuna advised him that he need not 
speak. Tr. 56-57. Dr. Metzner admitted that the "voices" 
could in reality be Connelly's interpretation of his own guilt, 
but explained that in his opinion, Connelly's psychosis moti-
. vated his confession. 
On the basis of this evidence the Colorado trial court 
decided that respondent's statements mus·t be suppressed be-
cause they were "involuntary." Relying on our decisions in 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), and Culombe v . 
Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568 (1961), the court ruled that a con-
fession is admissible only if it is a product of the defendant's 
rational intellect and "free will." Tr. 88. Although the 
court found that · the police had done nothing wrong or coer-
~ in securing respondent's confession, Connelly's illness 
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The trial court also found that Connelly's mental state viti-
ated his attempted waiver of the right to counsel and the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Accord-
ingly, respondent's initial statements and his custodial con-
fession ~e suppressed. Tr. 90. ~,,d., ~ 
The "Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. 702 P. 2d 722 
(Colo. 1985). In that court's view, the proper test for admis- p ~ 
sibility is whether the statements are "the pr_oifuct of a ra- k-:, f 
tional intellect and a free will." Id., at 728. Indeed, "the 
absence of police coercion or duress does not foreclose a find-
ing of involuntariness. One's capacity for rational judgment 
and free choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of 
severe mental illness as by external pressure." Ibid. The 
court found that the very admission of the evidence in a court 
of law was sufficient state action to implicate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The evidence fully supported the conclusion 
that respondent's initial statement was not the product of a 
rational intellect and a free will. The court then considered 
respondent's attempted waiver of his constitutional rights 
and found that respondent's mental condition precluded his 
ability to make a valid waiver. Id., at 729. The Colorado 
Supreme Court thus affirmed the trial court's decision to sup-
press all of Connelly's statements. 
II 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law." Just last 
Term, in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. --, -- (1985), we 
held that by virtue of the Due Process Clause "certain in-
t~s, either in isolation or as applied to tile 
unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive 
to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned." 






Indeed, coercive government misconduct was the catalyst 
for this Courts semma confession case, · Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). In that case, police officers 
extracted confessions from the accused through brutal tor-
ture. The Court had little difficulty concluding that even 
though the Fifth Amendment did not at that time apply to 
the States, the actions of the police were "revolting to the 
sense of justice." Id., at 286. The Court has retained this 
du~s, even after holcting, m Malloy ;: Hogan, 
378 U. S. 1 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination applies to the States. 
See Miller v. Fenton, supra, at--. 
Thus the cases considered by this Court over the fifty 
years since Brown v. Mississippi have focused upon the cru-
cial element of police overreaching. 1 While each confession 
case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclu-
sion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a 
substantial element of coercive olice conduct. Absent po-
lice con uct causally related to the confession, there is simply 
no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a 
1 E . g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978) (defendant subjected to 
four-hour interrogation while incapacitated and sedated in intensive-care 
unit); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519 (1968) (defendant, on medica-
tion, interrogated for over eighteen hours without food or sleep); Beecher 
v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35 (1967) (police officers held gun to the head of 
wounded confessant to extract confession); Davis v. North Carolina , 384 
U. S. 737 (1966) (sixteen days of incommunicado interrogation in closed cell 
without windows, limited food , and coercive tactics); Reck v. Pate, 367 
U. S. 433 (1961) (defendant held for four days with inadequate food and 
medical attention until confession obtained); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 
U. S. 568 (1961) (defendant held for five days of repeated questioning dur-
ing which police employed coercive tactics); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 
560 (1958) (defendant held incommunicado for three days with little food; 
confession obtained when officers informed defendant that Chief of Police 
. was preparing to admit lynch mob into jail); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 
U. S. 143 (1944) (defendant questioned by relays of officers for thirty-six 












criminal defendant of due_ process of law. 2 Respondent cor-
rectly notes that as interrogators have turned to more subtle 
forms of psychological persuasion, courts have found the 
mental condition of the defendant a more significant factor in 
the "voluntariness" calculus. See Spano v. New York, 360 
U. S. 315 (1959). But this fact does not justify a conclusion 
that a defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart from 
its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the in-
quiry into constitutional "voluntariness." 
Respondent relies on Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 
199 (1960), and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), for 
the proposition that the "deficient mental condition of the 
defendants in those cases was sufficient to render their con-
fessions involuntary." Brief for Respondent 20. But re-
spondent's reading of Blackburn and Townsend ignores the 
integral element of police overreaching present in both cases. 
In Blackburn, the Court found that the petitioner was proba-
bly insane at the time of his confession and the police learned 
during the interrogation that Blackburn had a history of men-
tal problems. The police exploited this weakness with coer-
cive tactics: "the eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation 
in a tiny room which was upon occasion literally filled with 
police officers; the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, 
or legal counsel; [and] the composition of the confession by 
the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn." 361 U. S., at 
207-208. These tactics supported a finding that the confes-
sion was involuntary. Indeed, the Court specifically con-
demned police activity that "wrings a confession out of an 
accused against his will." Id., at 206-207. Townsend pre-
sented a similar instance of police wrongdoing. In that case, 
a police physician had given Townsend a drug with truth-se-
rum properties. 372 U. S., at 298-299. The subsequent 
2 Even where there is causal connection between police misconduct and 
a defendant's confession, it does not automatically follow that there has 
been a violation of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cuw, 
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confession, obtained by officers who knew that Townsend had 
been given drugs, was held involuntary. These two cases 
demonstrate that while mental condition is surely relevant to 
an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere exami-
nation of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude 
the due process inquiry. 
Our "involuntary confession" jurisprudence is entirely con-
sistent with the settled law requiring some sort of "state ac-
tion" to support a claim of violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Colorado trial court, of 
course, found that the police committed no wrongful acts, and 
that finding has been neither challenged by the respondent 
nor disturbed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. The latter 
court, however, concluded that sufficient state action was 
present by virtue of the admission of the confession into evi-
dence in a court of the state. 702 P. 2d, at 728-729. 
The difficulty with the approach of the Supreme Court of 
Colorado is that it fails to recognize the essential link be-
tween coercive activity of the State, on the one nan , and a 
resulting co ession a efendant, on the other. The flaw 
in responden s constitutiona argument is that it would ex-
pand our previous line of "voluntariness" cases into a far-
ranging requirement that courts must divine a defendant's 
motivation for speaking or acting as he did even though there 
be no claim that governmental conduct coerced his decision. 
The most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking 
to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that 
evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause. See 
Walter v. United States, 447 U. _ S. 649, 656 (1980); Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 487-488 (1971); Burdeau 
v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 476 (1921). This Court has on I 
more than one occasion expressed a hesitancy to exclude rele-
vant and probative evidence even where substaJ?-tial claims of 
governmental violation of constitutional rights have been 
presented. See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 
620, 627 (1980); United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976); 
r 
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United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Moreover, 
· suppressing respondent's statements would serve abs~ tely 
no purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees. The pur-
pose of excluding evidence seized in violation of the Constitu-
tion is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitu-
tion. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906-913 
(1984). Only if we were to establish a brand new constitu-
tional right-the right of a criminal defendant to confess to 
his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated-
could respondent's present claim be sustained. 
We have previously cautioned against expanding "cur-
rently applicable exclusionary rules by erecting additional 
barriers to placing truthful. and probative evidence before 
state juries .... " Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 488-489 
(1972). We abide by that counsel now. "[T]he central pur-
pose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence," Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1986), and while we have previously 
held that exclusion of evidence may be necessary to protect 
constitutional guarantees, both the necessity for the collat-
eral inquiry and the exclusion of evidence deflect a criminal 
trial from its basic purpose. Respondent would now have us 
require sweeping inquiries into tne1t~al 
de en ant who has confesse , inquiries quite divorcecfrrom 
any coerc10n brought to bear on the defendant by the state. 
We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry 
to be resolved by state faws governing the admission of evi-
dence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A 
sta ement rendered by one in the condition of respondent 
· ht be roven to be uite unre 1a , but this is a matter to 
'-
be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e. g., 
Fed. Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. "The aim of the requirement 
of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, 









whether true or false." Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 
219, 236 (1941). 
We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predi-
cate to the finding that a confession is not "voluntary" within 
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respond-
ent's statements, and their admission into evidence, consti-
tute no violation of that clause. 
III 
The Supreme Court of Colorado went on to affirm the trial 
court's ruling that respondent's later statements made while 
in custody should be suppressed because respondent had not 
waived his right to consult an attorney and his right to re-
main silent. That court held that the State must bear its 
burden of proving waiver of these Miranda rights by "clear 
and convincing evidence." 702 P. 2d, at 729. Although we 
have stated in passing that the State bears a "heavy" burden 
in proving waiver, Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U. S. 469 (1980) 
(per curiam); North Carolina v. Butler 441 U. S. 369, 373 
(1979); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. at 475, we have never / 
held that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard is the 
appropriate one. 
In Lego v. Twomey, supra, this Court upheld a procedure 
in which the State established the voluntariness of a confes-
sion by no more than a preponderance of the evidence. We 
upheld it for two reasons. First, the voluntariness deter-
mination has nothing to do with the reliability of jury ver-
dicts; rather, it is designed to determine the presence of 
police coercion. Thus, voluntariness is irrelevant to the 
presence or absence of the elements of a crime, which must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358 (1970). Second, we rejected Lego's assertion 
that a high burden of proof was required to serve the values 
protected by the exclusionary rule. We surveyed the vari-
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the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and we 
stated that "[i]n each instance, and without regard to proba-
tive value, evidence is kept from the trier of guilt or inno-
cence for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the reliability 
of verdicts." Lego v. Twomey, supra, at 488. Moreover, 
we rejected the argument that "the importance of the values 
served by exclusionary rules is itself sufficient demonstration 
that the Constitution also requires admissibility to be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 404 U. S., at 488. Indeed, the 
Court found that "no substantial evidence has accumulated 
that federal rights have suffered from determining admissi-
bility by a preponderance of the evidence." Ibid. 
· We now reaffirm our holding in Lego: Whenever the State 
bears the burcfen o!proof in a motion to suppress a statement 
that the defendant -claims was obtained in violation of our 
Miranda doctrine, the State need prove waiver only by a 
preponderance of the evide ce. ee ix . i iams, 467 
U. S. 43 , 444, an n. ; United States v. Matlock, 415 
U. S. 164, 178, n. 14 (1974) ("[T]he controlling burden of 
proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater bur-
den than proof by a preponderance of the evidence ... "). 
Cf. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155, 161-162 (1957). If, as 
we held in Lego v. Twomey, supra, the voluntariness of a 
confession need be established only by · a preponderance of 
the evidence, then a waiver of the auxiliary protections es-
tablished in Miranda should require no higher burden of 
proof. "[E]xclusionary rules are very much aimed at deter-
ring lawless conduct by police and prosecution and it is very 
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's burden of proof in 
. . . suppression hearings would be sufficiently productive in 
this respect to outweigh the public interest in placing proba-
tive evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at 
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence." Lego v. 
Twomey, supra, at 489. See also United States v. Leon, 






We also think that the Supreme Court of Colorado was 
mistaken in its analysis of the question of whether respond-
ent had waived his Miranda rights in this case. 3 We have 
held that the government may not introduce in its case-in-
chief statements made by an individual subjected to custodial ) 
interrogation unless it proves that the accused was advised of 
his rights and "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" 
waived those rights. Miranda, supra, 384 U. S., at 444; 
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 373 (1979). The 
Supreme Court of Colorado in addressing this question relied 
on the testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist to the 
effect that respondent "was incapable of making an intelli-
gent and free decision with respect to his constitutional right 
of silence . . . and his constitutional right to confer with a 
lawyer before talking to the police." 702 P. 2d, at 729. 
We think that the Supreme Court of Colorado erred in im-
portin into this area of co sfitutional law notions oT "free 
will" that have no__pla~ th_ere. There is obvious y no reason 
to r~ tEe way of a "voluntariness" inquiry in the 
Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment 
confession context. The sole concern of the Fifth Amend-
ment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coer-
cion. See United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187 
(1977); Miranda, supra, at 460. Indeed, the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is not concerned "with moral and psychologi-
cal pressures emanating from sources other than official coer-
cion." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 305 (1985). The 
voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always de-
pended on the absence of police overreaching, not on "free 
choice" in any broader sense of the word. See Moran v. 
Burbine, supra, 475 U. S., at -- ("[T]he relinquishment of 
3 Petitioner conceded at oral argument that when Officer Anderson 
handcuffed respondent, the custody requirement of Miranda was satisfied. 
For purposes of our decision we accept that concession, and we similarly 
assume that the police officers "interrogated'.' respondent within the mean-
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the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was 
the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimi-
dation, coercion or deception. . . . [T]he record is devoid of 
any suggestion that police resorted to physical or psychologi-
cal pressure to elicit the statements") Fare v. Michael C. , 
442 U. S. 707, 727 (1979) (the defendant was "not worn down 
by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or 
by trickery or deceit. . . . The officers did not intimidate or 
threaten respondent in any way. Their questioning was re-
strained and free from the abuses that so concerned the 
Court in Miranda"). 
Respondent urges this Court to adopt his "free will" ration-
ale, and to find an attempted waiver invalid whenever the de-
fendant feels compelled to waive his rights by reason of any 
compulsion, even if the compulsion does not flow from the 
police. But such a treatment of the waiver issue would "cut 
this Court's holding in [Miranda] completely loose from its 
own explicitly stated rationale." Beckwith v. United States, 
425 U. S. 341, 345 (1976). Miranda protects defendants 
against government coercion leading them to surrender 
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further 
than that. Respondent's perception of coercion flowing from 
the "voice of God," however important or significant such a 
perception may be in other disciplines, is a matter to which 
the United States Constitution does not speak. 
IV 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is accord-
ingly reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion. 4 
It is so ordered. 
• It is possible to read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado as 
dealing with the "knowing and intelligent" aspect of the Miranda waiver as 
well as with the "voluntariness" aspect. Even if that is the case, however, 
we nonetheless reverse the judgment in its entirety because of our belief 
that the Supreme Court of Colorado's analysis of that aspect of the 







the constitutional sense. Reconsideration of the other aspect of the 
Miranda waiver on remand, not inconsistent with our opinion, is of course 
open to the Supreme Court of Colorado. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 
-,-(1986). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-660 
COLORADO, PETITIONER v. FRANCIS 
BARRY CONNELLY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
COLORADO 
[November-, 1986) 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the 
United States Constitution requires a court to suppress a 
confession when the mental state of the defendant, at the 
time he made the confession, interfered with his "rational in-
tellect" and his "free will." Because this decision seemed to 
conflict with prior holdings of this Court regarding the admis-
sibility of confessions and the validity of waivers, we granted 
certiorari. 474 U. S. -- (1986). We now reverse. 
I 
On August 18, 1983, Officer Patrick Anderson of the Den- 1 
ver Police Department was in uniform, working in an off-
duty capacity in downtown Denver. Respondent Francis 
Connelly approached Officer Anderson and, without any 
prompting, stated that he had murdered someone and 
wanted to talk about it. Anderson immediately advised re-
spondent that he had the right to remain silent, that anything 
he said could be used against him in court, and that he had 
the right to an attorney prior to any police questioning. See 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Respondent 
stated that he understood these rights but he still wanted to 
talk about the murder. Understandably bewildered by this 
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tions. Connelly denied that he had been drinking, denied 
that he had been taking any drugs, and stated that, in the 
past, he had been a patient in several mental hospitals. Offi-
cer Anderson again told Connelly that he was under no ob-
ligation to say anything. Connelly replied that it was "all 
right," and that he would talk to Officer Anderson because 
his conscience had been bothering him. To Officer Ander-
son, respondent appeared to understand fully the nature of 
his acts. Tr. 19. 
Shortly thereafter, Homicide Detective Stephen Antuna 
arrived. Respondent was again advised of his rights, and 
Detective Antuna asked him "what he had on his mind." 
Id. , at 24. Respondent answered that he had come all the 
way from Boston to confess to the murder of Mary Ann 
Junta, a young girl whom he had killed in Denver sometime 
during November 1982. Respondent was taken to police 
headquarters, and a search of police records revealed that 
the body of an unidentified female had been found in April 
1983. Respondent openly detailed his story to Detective 
Antuna and Sergeant Thomas Haney, and readily agreed to 
take the officers to the scene of the killing. Under 
Connelly's sole direction, the two officers and respondent 
proceeded in a police vehicle to the location of the crime. 
Respondent pointed out the exact location of ·the murder. 
Throughout this episode, Detective Antuna perceived no in-
dication whatsoever that respondent was suffering from any 
kind of mental illness. Id. , at 33-34. 
Respondent was held overnight. During an interview 
with the public defender's office the following morning, he 
became visibly disoriented. He began giving confused an-
swers to questions, and for the first time, stated that "voices" 
had told him to come to Denver and that he had followed the 
directions of these . voices in confessing. Id. , at 42. Re-
spondent was sent to a state hospital for evaluation. He was 
initially found incompetent to assist in his own defense. By 
-• -
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March 1984, however, the doctors evaluating respondent de-
termined that he was competent to proceed to trial. 
At a preliminary hearing, respondent moved to suppress 
all of his statements. Doctor Jeffrey Metzner, a psychiatrist 
employed by the state hospital, testified that respondent was 
suff erin~ from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic 
state at least as of August 17, 1983, the day before he con-
fessed. Metzner's interviews with respondent revealed that 
respondent was following the "voice of God." This voice in-
structed respondent to withdraw money from the bank, to 
buy an airplane ticket, and to fly from Boston to Denver. 
When respondent arrived from Boston, God's voice became 
stronger and told respondent either to confess to the killing 
or to commit suicide. Reluctantly following the command of 
the voices, respondent approached Officer Anderson and 
confessed. 
Dr. Metzner testified that, in his expert opinion, respond-
ent was experiencing "command hallucinations." Id., at 56. 
This condition interfered with respondent's "volitional abili-
ties; that is, his ability to make free and rational choices." 
Ibid. Dr. Metzner further testified that Connelly's illness 
did not significantly impair his cognitive abilities. Thus, re-
spondent understood the rights he had when Officer Ander-
son and Detective Antuna advised him that he need not 
speak. Id., at 56-57. Dr. Metzner admitted that the 
"voices" could in reality be Connelly's interpretation of his 
own guilt, but explained that in his opinion, Connelly's psy-
chosis motivated his confession. 
On the basis of this evidence the Colorado trial court 
decided that respondent's statements must be suppressed be-
cause they were "involuntary." Relying on our decisions in 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), and Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568 (1961), the court ruled that a con-
fession is admissible only if it is a product of the defendant's 
rational intellect and "free will." Tr. 88. Although the 
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cive in securing respondent's confession, Connelly's illness 
destroyed his volition and compelled him to confess. Id. , at 
89. The trial court also found that Connelly's mental state 
vitiated his attempted waiver of the right to counsel and the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Accord-
ingly, respondent's initial statements and his custodial con-
fession were suppressed. Id., at 90. 
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. 702 P. 2d 722 
(1985). In that court's view, the proper test for admissibility 
is whether the statements are "the product of a rational intel-
lect and a free will." Id., at 728. Indeed, "the absence of 
police coercion or duress does not foreclose a finding of invol-
untariness. One's capacity for rational judgment and free 
choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe 
mental illness as by external pressure." Ibid. The court 
found that the very admission of the evidence in a court of 
law was sufficient state action to implicate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The evidence fully supported the conclusion 
that respondent's initial statement was not the product of a 
rational intellect and a free will. The court then considered 
respondent's attempted waiver of his constitutional rights 
and found that respondent's mental condition precluded his 
ability to make a valid waiver. Id., at 729. The Colorado 
Supreme Court thus affirmed the trial court's decision to sup-
press all of Connelly's statements. 
II 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law." Just last 
Term, in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. --, -- (1985), we 
held that by virtue of the Due Process Clause "certain in-
terrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the 






to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned." 
See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. --, -- (1986). 
Indeed, coercive government misconduct was the catalyst 
for this Court's seminal confession case, Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). In that case, police officers 
extracted confessions from the accused through brutal tor-
ture. The Court had little difficulty concluding that even 
though the Fifth Amendment did not at that time apply to 
the States, the actions of the police were "revolting to the 
sense of justice." Id., at 286. The Court has retained this 
due process focus, even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U. S. 1 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination applies to the States. 
See Miller v. Fenton, supra, at--. 
Thus the cases considered by this Court over the 50 years 
since Braum v. Mississippi have focused upon the crucial ele-
ment of police overreaching.' While each confession case 
has turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclusion 
that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a sub-
stantial element of coercive police conduct. Absent police 
conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no 
'E. g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978) (defendant subjected to 
four-hour interrogation while incapacitated and sedated in intensive-care 
unit); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519 (1968) (defendant, on medica-
tion, interrogated for over eighteen hours without food or sleep); Beecher 
v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35 (1967) (police officers held gun to the head of 
wounded confessant to extract confession); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 
U. S. 737 (1966) (sixteen days of incommunicado interrogation in closed cell 
without windows, limited food, and coercive tactics); Reck v. Pate, 367 
U. S. 433 (1961) (defendant held for four days with inadequate food and 
medical attention until confession obtained); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 
U. S. 568 (1961) (defendant held for five days of repeated questioning dur-
ing which police employed coercive tactics); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 
560 (1958) (defendant held incommunicado for three days with little food; 
confession obtained when officers informed defendant that Chief of Police 
was preparing to admit lynch mob into jail); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 
U. S. 143 (1944) (defendant questioned by relays of officers for thirty-six 
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basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a crimi-
nal defendant of due process of law. 2 Respondent correctly 
notes that as interrogators have turned to more subtle forms 
of psychological persuasion, courts have found the mental 
condition of the defendant a more significant factor in the 
"voluntariness" calculus. See Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 
315 (1959). But this fact does not justify a conclusion that a 
defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart from its re-
lation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry 
into constitutional "voluntariness." 
Respondent relies on Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 
199 (1960), and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), for 
the proposition that the "deficient mental condition of the 
defendants in those cases was sufficient to render their con-
fessions involuntary." Brief for Respondent 20. But re-
spondent's reading of Blackburn and Townsend ignores the 
integral element of police overreaching present in both cases. 
In Blackburn, the Court found that the petitioner was proba-
bly insane at the time of his confession and the police learned 
during the interrogation that Blackburn had a history of men-
tal problems. The police exploited this weakness with coer-
cive tactics: "the eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation 
in a tiny room which was upon occasion literally filled with 
police officers; the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, 
or legal counsel; [and] the composition of the confession by 
the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn." 361 U. S., at 
207-208. These tactics supported a finding that the confes-
sion was involuntary. Indeed, the Court specifically con-
demned police activity that "wrings a confession out of an 
accused against his will." Id., at 206-207. Townsend pre-
sented a similar instance of police wrongdoing. In that case, 
a police physician had given Townsend a drug with truth-se-
2 Even where there is causal connection between police misconduct and 
a defendant's confession, it does not automatically follow that there has 
been a violation of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 






rum properties. 372 U. S., at 298-299. The subsequent 
confession, obtained by officers who knew that Townsend had 
been given drugs, was held involuntary. These two cases 
demonstrate that while mental condition is surely relevant to 
an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere exami-
nation of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude 
the due process inquiry. 
Our "involuntary confession" jurisprudence is entirely con-
sistent with the settled law requiring some sort of "state ac-
tion" to support a claim. of violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Colorado trial court, of 
course, found that the police committed no wrongful acts, and 
that finding has been neither challenged by the respondent 
nor disturbed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. The latter 
court, however, concluded that sufficient state action was 
present by virtue of the admission of the confession into evi-
dence in a court of the State. 702 P. 2d, at 728-729. 
The difficulty with the approach of the Supreme Court of 
Colorado is that it fails to recognize the essential link be-
tween coercive activity of the State, on the one hand, and a 
resulting confession by a defendant, on the other. The flaw 
in respondent's constitutional argument is that it would ex-
pand our previous line of "voluntariness" cases into a far-
ranging requirement that courts must divine a defendant's 
motivation for speaking or acting as he did even though there 
be no claim that governmental conduct coerced his decision. 
The most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking 
to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that 
evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause. See 
Walter v. United States, 447 U. S. 649, 656 (1980); Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 487-488 (1971); Burdeau 
v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 476 (1921). We have also ob-
served that "[j]urists and scholars have recognized that the 
exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal 
interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what con-
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U. S. 433, 448-449 (1976). See also United States v. Ha-
vens, 446 U. S. 620, 627 (1980); United States v. Calandra, 
414 U. S. 338 (1974). Moreover, suppressing respondent's 
statements would serve absolutely no purpose in enforcing 
constitutional guarantees. The purpose of excluding evi-
dence seized . in violation of the Constitution is to substan-
tially deter future violations of the Constitution. See United 
States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906-913 (1984). Only if we 
were to establish a brand new constitutional right-the right 
of a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when to-
tally rational and properly motivated-could respondent's 
present claim be sustained. 
We have previously cautioned against expanding "cur-
rently applicable exclusionary rules by erecting additional 
barriers to placing truthful and probative evidence before 
state juries .... " Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 488-489 
(1972). We abide by that counsel now. "[T]he central pur-
pose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence," Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
475 U. S. --, -- (1986), and while we have previously 
held that exclusion of evidence may be necessary to protect 
constitutional guarantees, both the necessity for the collat-
eral inquiry and the exclusion of evidence deflect a criminal 
trial from its basic purpose. Respondent would now have us 
require sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal 
defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from 
any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State. 
We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry 
to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evi-
dence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A 
statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent 
might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to 
be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e. g. , 
Fed. Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. "The aim of the requirement 
of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, 
-
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but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, 
whether true or false." Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 
219, 236 (1941). 
We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predi-
cate to the finding that a confession is not "voluntary'' within 
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respond-
ent's statements, and their admission into evidence, consti-
tute no violation of that Clause. 
III 
The Supreme Court of Colorado went on to affirm the trial 
court's ruling that respondent's later statements made while 
in custody should be suppressed because respondent had not 
waived his right to consult an attorney and his right to re-
main silent. That court held that the State must bear its 
burden of proving waiver of these Miranda rights by "clear 
and convincing evidence." 702 P. 2d, at 729. Although we 
have stated in passing that the State bears a "heavy" burden 
in proving waiver, Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U. S. 469 (1980) 
(per curiam); North Carolina v. Butler 441 U. S. 369, 373 
(1979); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 475, we have never 
held that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard is the 
appropriate one. 
In Lego v. Twomey, supra, this Court upheld a procedure 
in which the State established the voluntariness of a confes-
sion by no more than a preponderance of the evidence. We 
upheld it for two reasons. First, the voluntariness deter-
mination has nothing to do with the reliability of jury ver-
dicts; rather, it is designed to determine the presence of 
police coercion. Thus, voluntariness is irrelevant to the 
presence or absence of the elements of a crime, which must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358 (1970). Second, we rejected Lego's assertion 
that a high burden of proof was required to serve the values 
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ous reasons for excluding evidence, including a violation of 
the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and we 
stated that "[i]n each instance, and without regard to its pro-
bative value, evidence is kept from the trier of guilt or inno-
cence for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the reliability 
of verdicts." Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S., at 488. More-
over, we rejected the argument that "the importance of the 
values served by exclusionary rules is itself sufficient dem-
onstration that the Constitution also requires admissibility to 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. · Indeed, the 
Court found that "no substantial evidence has accumulated 
that federal rights have suffered from determining admissi-
bility by a preponderance of the evidence." Ibid. 
We now reaffirm our holding in Lego: Whenever the State 
bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement 
that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our 
Miranda doctrine, the State need prove waiver only by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See Nix v. Williams, 467 
U. S. 431, 444, and n. 5 (1984); United States v. Matlock, 415 
U. S. 164, 178, n. 14 (1974) ("[T]he controlling burden of 
proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater bur-
den than proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . "). 
Cf. Moore v. Michigan , 355 U. S. 155, 161-162 (1957). If, as 
we h~ld in Lego v. Twomey, supra, the voluntariness of a 
confession need be established only by a preponderance of 
the evidence, then a waiver of the auxiliary protections es-
tablished in Miranda should require no higher burden of 
proof. "[E]xclusionary rules are very much aimed at deter-
ring lawless conduct by police and prosecution and it is very 
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's burden of proof in 
. . . suppression hearings would be sufficiently productive in 
this respect to outweigh the public interest in placing proba-
tive evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at 
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence." Lego v. 
Twomey, supra, at 489. See also United States v. Leon, 
supra, at 906-913. 
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We also think that the Supreme Court of Colorado was 
mistaken in its analysis of the question of whether respond-
ent had waived his Miranda rights in this case. 3 Of course, I 
a waiver must at a minimum be "voluntary" to be effective 
against an accused. Miranda, supra, at 444, 476; North 
Carolina v. Butler, supra, at 373. The Supreme Court of 
Colorado in addressing this question relied on the testimony 
of the court-appointed psychiatrist to the effect that respond- I 
ent was not capable of making a "free decision with respect to 
his constitutional right of silence . . . and his constitutional 
right to confer with a lawyer before talking to the police." 
702 P. 2d, at 729. 
We think that the Supreme Court of Colorado erred in im-
porting into this area of constitutional law notions of "free 
will" that have no place there. There is obviously no reason 
to require more in the way of a "voluntariness" inquiry in the 
Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment 
confession context. The sole concern of the Fifth Amend-
ment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coer-
cion. See United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187 
(1977); Miranda, supra, at 460. Indeed, the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is not concerned "with moral and psychologi-
cal pressures to confess emanating from sources other than 
official coercion." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 305 
(1985). The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has 
always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not 
on "free choice" in any broader sense of the word. See 
Moran v. Burbine, 4 75 U. S., at -- ("[T]he relinquishment 
of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was 
the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimi-
dation, coercion or deception. . . . [T]he record is devoid of 
• Petitioner conceded at oral argument that when Officer Anderson 
handcuffed respondent, the custody requirement of Miranda was satisfied. 
For purposes of our decision we accept that concession, and we similarly 
assume that the police officers "interrogated" respondent within the mean-






any suggestion that police resorted to physical or psychologi-
cal pressure to elicit the statements"); Fare v. Michael C., 
442 U. S. 707, 726-727 (1979) (The defendant was "not worn 
down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy question-
ing or by trickery or deceit. . . . The officers did not intimi-
date or threaten respondent in any way. Their questioning 
was restrained and free from the abuses that so concerned 
the Court in Miranda"). 
Respondent urges this Court to adopt his "free will" ration-
ale, and to find an attempted waiver invalid whenever the de-
fendant feels compelled to waive his rights by reason of any 
compulsion, even if the compulsion does not flow from the 
police. But such a treatment of the waiver issue would "cut 
this Court's holding in [Miranda] completely loose from its 
own explicitly stated rationale." Beckwith v. United States , 
425 U. S. 341, 345 (1976). Miranda protects defendants 
against government coercion leading them to surrender 
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further 
than that. Respondent's perception of coercion flowing from 
the "voice of God," however important or significant such a 
perception may be in other disciplines, is a matter to which 
the United States Constitution does not speak. 
IV 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is accord-
ingly reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion. 4 
It is so ordered. 
• It is possible to read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado as 
finding respondent's Miranda waiver invalid on other grounds. Even if 
that is the case, however, we nonetheless reverse the judgment in its en-
tirety because of our belief that the Supreme Court of Colorado's analysis 
was influenced by its mistaken view of "voluntariness" in the constitutional 
sense. Reconsideration of other issues, not inconsistent with our opinion, 
is of course open to the Supreme Court of Colorado on remand. 
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